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 In the 1950s and 1960s, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) held great promise.  Countries
in the region had natural resources, extensive land, and in many cases peasant agriculture
that seemed to fit well with capitalist development. Two world wars had left SSA
generally unscathed, destructive civil wars had been uncommon and independence brought
a wave of optimism that anything could be achieved.  But the promise has gone unfulfilled. 
Modern economic growth has succeeded in raising the well-being of hundreds of millions
of people in many developing economies throughout the world, but it has sputtered
throughout most of Africa.  Why has economic growth taken hold in many Asian and
Latin American countries?  Why not in Africa?
SSA has had periods of moderate economic growth.  In 1996 GDP grew by 4.4
percent, a rate unprecedented in recent decades.  Some observers cited this achievement
as the long-awaited turnaround in the region's economic fortunes (Madavo and Sarbib
1997).  But 1997 brought another downturn, with growth estimated at under 4 percent.
Short fleeting spurts of growth, following extended periods of economic decline, cannot
catapult countries into the modern economic world.  A longer term perspective reveals
that even with recent improvements in GDP, Africans have lost immense ground in the
past several decades.  Of SSA's 1997 population, 94 percent live in countries where
income per capita has retrogressed over extended periods (Table 1).
For some Africans the extent of economic decline has been cataclysmic. 
Most SSA economies achieved positive growth in the 1960s and 1970s, but many reached
their peak GDP per capita levels before 1980.  In the ensuing decades, economic decline
has overwhelmed prior advances.  Thirty-six percent of the region's population live in
economies that in 1995 had not regained the per capita income levels first achieved before
1960.  Another 6 percent are below levels first achieved by 1970, 41 percent below 19802
levels and 11 percent below 1990 levels.  Only 35 million out of SSA's population of
almost six hundred million people reside in nations that had higher per capita incomes in
1995 than they had ever achieved before.
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Other indicators also show substantial economic retrogression: massive drops in
modern sector employment as a share of the labor force; real wages of urban workers
falling to subsistence levels; reverse migration from cities to rural areas; loss of shares of
world trade and of foreign investment; absolute poverty rates climbing above 50 percent;
and declines in food production per capita.  All this has happened while SSA received the
largest influx of foreign aid relative to GDP in the world, repeated IMF and World Bank
programs, and a sizable increase in expenditures on schooling.
Many economists have analyzed SSA's poor economic performance.  One group of
explanations focuses on factors associated with more rapid growth in other regions that
SSA appears to lack.  Among these factors, three stand out: (1) low levels of human
capital; (2) a lack of openness to trade and foreign capital; and (3) urban bias and high
income inequality.  Another set of explanations focuses on features which are SSA-
specific: high degrees of ethnic fractionalization, frequency of land-locked states and high
concentration of land in the tropics.  
These explanations are not compelling in explaining SSA's failure to achieve more
rapid economic growth.  The stress on investments in education as a prerequisite for more
rapid growth is misplaced.  Many developing nations have progressed with limited
investments in schooling.  Others have failed to progress with substantial investments. 
Trade and foreign capital inflows are important to growth but are far from a sufficient
condition for economic progress.  Inward-looking policies have failed, but simply lowering
trade barriers or properly realigning exchange rates does not guarantee prosperity.   As for3
urban bias and inequality, the urban bias that once characterized SSA has disappeared and
income inequality, though high in some SSA countries, is not so extreme as to foreclose
successful growth and poverty alleviation.  Similarly, the Africa-specific explanations
reveal real constraints but are not the core explanation for SSA's growth tragedy. 
Is SSA's Economic Growth Constrained by Too Little Human Capital?
SSA's low stock of human capital – reflected in relatively high rates of adult
illiteracy and low school enrollment rates (Table 2) – would seem a natural cause for
SSA's lack of economic growth.  A great deal of micro and macro evidence has been
accumulated linking education, productivity and growth.  But closer inspection of the
micro evidence on the returns to education in the region and of cross-country growth
regressions which include schooling as an independent variable suggests another
interpretation.  An expansion in human capital is neither sufficient for more rapid growth
nor is SSA's lack of human capital necessarily a barrier to accelerated growth. 
The Equivocal Effect of Educational Investments in Sub-Saharan Africa
Economists have changed their assessment of the returns to schooling in SSA. 
Estimates reviewed by Psacharopolous (1994) indicate that rates of return to education in
Africa are high relative to the social opportunity cost of capital and to rates prevailing in
other regions.  The highest returns are for primary school education.  If the claim that
educational investment is a sufficient condition for growth were true, this would have
produced sizeable growth in SSA since most African countries have increased lower level
school enrollments rapidly.  But SSA's economies retrogressed.  Something evidently is
wrong about the claim that investments in primary education have a high return in Africa. 
  Bennell (1996) suggests one solution.  Carefully examining the studies that form4
the basis of the average rates of return for education in SSA reported by Psacharopolous,
Bennell concludes that these studies are seriously flawed in data and methodology, and
cannot be relied upon.  He argues that social rates of return to education have fallen over
the period of economic retrogression and, especially at the primary level, may now be
lower than the social opportunity cost of capital.  
Detailed econometric analysis by Glewwe (1991) on Ghana, based on the 1988-89
GLSS (Ghana Living Standards Survey), confirms this view. Glewwe has a rich data set
that includes direct measures of acquired cognitive skills in reading and mathematics, as
well as test scores on innate ability.  The results indicate private returns to primary
education of only a few percentage points, far lower than those usually cited for SSA and
other regions.   Nielsen and Westergard-Nielsen (1998) similarly report low or negligible
returns to schooling in their study of Zambia, as do Bigsten et al. (1997) for a number of
other African countries.
Glewwe also reports returns for secondary and tertiary education that are higher
than at the primary level.  This "convexity" of returns by education level has been found in
many other studies of SSA
2 and contrasts with patterns elsewhere.  It also is inconsistent
with the notion that investments at the primary level will greatly raise productivity in
Africa.  Little or no returns at the primary level, on the other hand, is consistent with
observed stagnation or decline in school enrollment rates in Ghana and several other SSA
countries.
3  Because of low economic returns, parents may decide that the costs of
schooling outweigh the benefits and elect not to send their children to school. 
Studies of the rate of return to education tend to focus on wage earners, who in
SSA are an increasingly small segment of the labor force.  The majority of Africans are
self-employed, either on small family plots or in the informal sector.  What impact does5
more education have on these workers?  The conventional result, that education enhances
farm productivity, is based primarily on non-African results.  According to Collier and
Gunning (1997), statistically significant findings of education raising farm productivity are
rare in SSA.  With the majority of the region's labor force still engaged in agriculture, the
lack of such productivity enhancing effects might explain why the accumulation of human
capital has done little for economic growth. 
Why has primary education yielded so low a return in Africa?  One possible
explanation is the low quality of schooling.   Counting years of schooling is a rough
approximation for the accumulation of productive human capital.  If teachers know little
more than their students, or if the curriculum is irrelevant to employment opportunities
and market realities, then years of schooling produce little educational capital.  Concern
over school quality is raised throughout the world.   Rapidly expanding school systems, as
in Africa, suffer from quality problem, but we know of no study that shows that poor
school quality reduces the return on education to zero!
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Rosenzweig (1995) presents another possible explanation: "Schooling investments
are not a universal panacea; reaping returns from such investments requires that the scope
for productive learning be expanded via either technical innovation or changes in market
and political regimes."  In the SSA context, there has been no analogue to Asia's Green
Revolution or to East Asia's outward-orientation and market liberalizations.  This may
explain the pattern of low returns that have constrained the region's accumulation of years
of schooling from contributing more to the region's economic growth.
5  The problem has
been a lack of opportunities rather than a lack of schooling.
Another explanation that fits the African experience is that the return to schooling
requires stable property relations and a safe economic environment, which have been6
lacking in most African states.  Wars, corruption, revolutions, and other instabilities that
disturb or distort the normal functioning of markets make the value of schooling less than
it would be in a more stable world.  If your country is riven with strife, better to pick up a
gun than pick up a book.
What do growth regressions say?
From the pioneering work of Denison (1967) to recent analyses of the East Asian
Economic Miracle (World Bank 1993), analysts have identified education as an important
determinant of aggregate economic growth.  Many economists believe that modern
growth regressions show that education is a sufficient factor for increasing per capita
incomes.  This conclusion is derived from a production function approach to growth
accounting which implicitly assumes a technological relationship where increases in the
stock of human capital, ceteris paribus, yield economic growth.  If this were true, SSA's
low stock of human capital could readily explain at least some of the region's poor growth
record.  But regressions relating human capital to growth across countries do not tell a
clear and convincing story.  
Regression results differ depending on the functional form of the equation linking
education to growth; the inclusion/exclusion of other potential growth determinants; and
whether the regression focuses on changes in human capital or its level.  Some studies
(such as Levine and Renelt (1992)) measure schooling by enrollment rates. These studies
generally find that initial secondary-school enrollment rates are positively correlated with
growth rates, but that schooling is much more weakly connected to growth than
investment in physical capital.  Coefficients on enrollments, unlike the ones on physical
capital, turn insignificant when other variables -- including regional dummies, measures of
political stability, and/or measures of openness -- are entered.
6   7
But enrollment rates are a poor proxy for the accumulation of education:  they
measure initial conditions, not the increasing stock of educated manpower available to an
economy.
7  According to most growth theories, it is the accumulation of factors of
production, both physical and human capital, along with the increasing productivity of
these factors, that determines how quickly an economy will grow.  Accordingly, other
studies have used a perpetual inventory of enrollment rates to estimate the stock of human
capital.  Using this measure, Barro (1997) finds that the level of human capital for men has
a positive effect on growth while that for women has a negative effect. Pritchett (1997)
directly incorporates the accumulation of years of schooling by regressing growth in GDP
per worker on growth of physical and human capital, and finds that physical capital
dominates the growth equation while growth in the education levels of the work force is
weakly and negatively correlated with economic growth!
8  
An alternative way to specify the accumulation of schooling is to relate growth in
GDP per capita (or per worker) to absolute changes in the years of schooling rather than
to percentage changes.  This approach is based on micro foundations where the logarithm
of wages is related to absolute levels of schooling.
9  Employing absolute rather than
relative changes in schooling raises the education coefficient in growth regressions, in part,
because countries with few years of schooling, such as those in Africa, invariably have
much smaller changes in absolute years than in the percentage growth in years of
schooling.  For example, a country that increased education from 2 to 4 years has a two
year increase rather than a 100% increase, while one that increased education from 10 to
12 years would also have a 2 year increase rather than a 20% increase. 
Topel (1998) adopts this approach and regresses growth rates on absolute changes
in schooling.  He also observes that the estimated coefficient on the growth of capital is8
extremely high, suggesting an alternative specification in which the coefficient on capital is
set at capital's share of GDP.  With these two changes, he finds a positive coefficient on
both the level and the growth of schooling in a growth equation, though he cautions that
analysts should focus on the micro-studies not macro growth regressions.  Krueger and
Lindahl (1998) carry the analysis a step further.  They show that another problem in the
macro growth regressions is that the schooling variable is measured with considerable
error, imparting a downward bias on measures of changes in schooling.  Correcting for
this bias and predetermining the coefficient on the growth of capital, yields a large
coefficient on changes in education in their growth regressions. But when they allow the
capital coefficient to be unconstrained, they find that schooling has a moderate coefficient
with weak statistical significance.
10 
In sum, the equivocal effects of education on productivity found in the micro
evidence for SSA reappear in the macro studies on all countries.  Changes in the level of
absolute years of schooling of workers seem to have some positive link to growth, but the
link varies with specification and, at best, is far from overwhelming; changes in the
percentage growth of schooling are not positively related to growth; while countries with
high initial levels of schooling generally grow faster than others.  In all calculations
investments in physical capital are more strongly and robustly related to economic growth
than are investments in human capital.  
Looking at specific countries, there are many counter-cases to the claim that
education per se produces economic growth.  In 1965, Indonesia and Thailand had
enrollment rates in primary school that were not much greater than those in Ghana and
Zaire, yet the Southeast Asian nations grew and the two African states did not (Perkins
and Roemer 1994). Despite effectively destroying much of its human capital during the9
Cultural Revolution and having a very low rate of return to schooling during the 1980s
(Freeman 1999), China has managed to grow extremely rapidly.  
 The good news for Africa from the diverse studies is that investment in physical
capital is well correlated with growth, and physical capital can be more readily
accumulated than can human capital.  In the right environment, domestic and foreign
savings can be redirected toward productive opportunities rapidly.  By comparison, it may
take a decade or more to produce a significant increase in the mean education level of the
labor force.  
This does not mean that African countries should not invest in schooling.  With a
resumption of economic growth parents in Africa will find schooling a worthwhile
investment and will send their children to school.  Schooling has significant benefits that
do not show up in national accounts.  Education, especially of girls, reduces own and child
mortality.  It may also foster the evolution of democratic institutions.  But the expansion
of education should not be viewed as a sufficient condition for achieving individual or
economy-wide prosperity, nor should slow expansion of education be seen as an absolute
barrier to SSA's growth.  
Savior or Threat:  Globalization and SSA
 Is greater openness to trade and foreign capital the key to economic growth in
Africa?  Or is the opposite true -- that African prospects have been diminished by
globalization of the world economy?
The view that openness is the key to economic prosperity is part of the
“Washington Consensus” about economic development.  This view gains some support
from cross-country growth regressions.  Sachs and Warner (1995,1997) identify openness10
to world markets for capital, goods and technology as "crucial elements of any pro-growth
package."  Their measure of openness captures a number of dimensions of trade and
exchange rate policy, is of the expected sign and is highly significant in equations that
include standard measures of investment in human and physical capital.
11  These findings
provide econometric backing to the policy advice contained in many prescriptions for
Africa, namely, to liberalize markets for foreign exchange and traded goods.  
But not all measures of openness are correlated with growth:  Harrison (1995)
finds that some measures of openness are related to growth but that the trade share of
GDP and some other commonly used measures are not so related;  Harrison (1998)
indicates that several measures, including the Sachs and Warner (1995) measure of
openness, are not robust to differences in specification; and Pritchett (1996) confirms the
tenuous nature of some of the cross country regressions linking openness to growth, by
finding little correlation among alternative indices of openness and the stance of trade
policy.  Once again the growth regression literature is not sufficiently compelling. There
are results that an advocate of openness can cite, and results that a skeptic can cite. 
Openness has the potential to increase investment, improve resource allocation and
facilitate the transmission of new ideas and technology.  But even in the growth
regressions that lend most support for the role of greater openness, the lion's share of the
variance in cross-country growth rates is not explained by openness.  The implication is
that domestic markets and policies matter as well.
This claim is consistent with considerable evidence that even in the exemplar
capitalist economy, the United States, trade is not the major determinant of economic
outcomes.  Most researchers have concluded that increased North-South trade is not the
main reason for growing wage inequality/falling real wages among unskilled workers in11
the United States nor of rising unemployment in Europe (Freeman 1995), though some
disagree (Wood 1994).   The vast majority of workers are engaged in non-traded goods,
and supply and demand conditions in these markets have a strong influence on labor
market outcomes.  For this same reason, factor market dislocations from NAFTA and
other new trading arrangements have been relatively small.  If trade only has a limited
impact on factor rewards, then its impact on GDP must be limited too.
Although global flows of capital are much in the news, there is strong evidence,
beginning with Feldstein and Horioka (1980), that domestic investment is correlated with
domestic savings.
12  This home country bias in investment highlights the importance of
domestic market conditions and institutions in capital accumulation.   Relative to other
regions, moreover, SSA displays less home country bias in investment.  Collier and
Gunning (1997) compare the portfolio choices of wealth holders across regions by
combining data on capital flight and domestic capital stocks.  They find that despite a
lower level of wealth per worker than in any other region, Africa's wealth owners have
relocated 37 percent of their wealth outside the continent.  This compares to a ratio of 17
percent in Latin America and only 3 percent in East Asia. They note, "If Africa reduced its
capital flight to that of Asia, its capital stock would increase by a half."   Protection of
property rights and an overall reduction in the riskiness of the domestic economic
environment are probably more important factors in encouraging domestic savings to be
invested in SSA's economies than more open economies, though the latter might help as
well.
In any case, most SSA countries have moved toward greater openness.  The
import substitution strategies of the past, including reliance on highly over-valued
exchange rates, failed.  Today black market premiums on foreign exchange have almost12
disappeared and some of the region's recent positive growth rates may be linked to the
gradual abandonment of inward-looking strategies and the policies that supported them.
Still, Africa remains marginalized in the world economy (Table 3).  All of SSA accounted
for only 1.4 percent of world trade (exports plus imports) in 1995 and only 5.9 percent of
net foreign private capital flowing into the low and middle income economies.  But this is
not because SSA's economies trade too little.  As Rodrik (1997) points out, relative to
their size, income level and geographical location, the economies of SSA exhibit normal
trade ratios.
13  If trade policies have not repressed trade volumes below cross-country
benchmarks they cannot be “the” cause of Africa’s current economic problems.
There is also a different view about the relation between world trade and African
economic progress.  This is the argument that competition from other low-income
economies today forecloses African countries from advancing through the global trading
system.  In the 1960s and 1970s a low-income SSA nation could have prospered by
exporting labor-intensive goods.  But today, the argument goes, the entry of China, India
and other large labor abundant economies, has depressed the prices of labor-intensive
goods and thus cut-off the chances for SSA's labor force of about 200 million. 
Concern about the limits to the absorptive capacity of markets in the North for
labor-intensive exports from the South is not new.  In the early 1980s Cline (1982) asked
the question, "Can the East Asian Model of Development Be Generalized?", and
concluded that it would be a fallacy of composition to believe the export-led strategy
followed by Hong-Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan could be replicated.  But Cline
was proven wrong by the subsequent success of exports from China, Indonesia, Thailand
and other low wage Asian economies.  There was greater scope for import penetration in
the North than he assumed plus intra-Asian trade grew in importance.  If the global13
economy has managed to accommodate China's entry, there will be room for the much
smaller economies of SSA to participate.  Recent simulations of China's impact on world
markets reinforces this view.  The World Bank (1997) employs a set of assumptions about
regional growth trends, future international trade agreements, falling global transport
costs, etc., and projects resulting regional export shares.  By 2020 China's share of world
exports (including Hong Kong) is estimated to rise from 4.3 percent (1992) to 11.3
percent.  China will become a greater force in the global economy.   But these simulations
show that China will not capture nor dominate global markets.
14  The entry of China, India
and other labor abundant economies may make it more difficult for SSA to export labor-
intensive commodities but a growing world economy will also provide new market
opportunities for goods from SSA.  
Openness to trade and the outside world can help Africa develop.  Foreign savings
can finance much needed investments.  Ideas, information and technology from abroad can
increase the returns to schooling, physical capital and infrastructure.  But openness alone
is not sufficient to guarantee growth.  
Is There Too Much Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa?
At one stage growth economists believed that inequality contributed to growth.
Kaldor (1955-56) and Lewis (1954) saw income inequality as a source of added savings
for investment and growth.  The Harris-Todaro (1970) model, developed with SSA in
mind, was driven by assumptions about the rural-urban income gap which fueled rural to
urban migration, exacerbated urban unemployment and generated a misallocation of
resources that inhibited economic growth.  For Lipton (1977), "urban bias" drained the
rural economy's surplus, regressively allocated government expenditures to the minority of14
the population living in cities and was the core reason, as the title of his book suggests,
Why Poor People Stay Poor.
Recent empirical analysis of the impact of inequality on growth suggests the
opposite: that high levels of inequality adversely affect economic growth.  Beginning with
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellina (1994), analysts have entered
measures of inequality in standard growth regressions and found that their effect is
negative.  Benabou (1996) lists twenty-three studies that link inequality either to growth
of GDP per capita or to investment.  The regressions give a consistent message: low
inequality improves growth with a fairly robust coefficient.  “A one standard deviation
decrease in inequality raises the annual growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.5 to 0.8
percentage points.”  The divergent growth performance of the Philippines with its high
level of inequality and Korea, with its low inequality, or between East Asia and Latin
America underlie these regression results.  One possible reason for this outcome is that
lower inequality can increase political and macroeconomic stability, hence investment and
growth.  When the interests of rich and poor are closer together, policies stand a better
chance of avoiding the wide swings caused by trying to serve the needs of one group
versus another. 
If Africa had extremely high levels of inequality and suffered from excessive urban
bias, inequality could be a substantial drag on growth.  But while Africa does not have
East Asia’s low levels of  inequality, neither is it an area of consistently high inequality. 
Data compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996) permit a comparison of income inequality
both within SSA and between SSA and other regions (Table 4).  The quality of data on
income distribution is variable and the coverage, especially in Africa, is incomplete.  With
these limitations in mind, the data indicate that inequality in SSA varies a great deal. 15
Some economies (Guinea Bissau, South Africa) have income inequality comparable to the
highly regressive outcomes in Brazil and other countries in Latin America.  But SSA also
has its share of more equal distributions with Ghana, Niger and Tanzania falling within the
inequality range associated with East Asia.  
The traditional criticism of African countries as suffering from extreme urban bias
also does not hold up today, if it was ever true.  Jamal and Weeks (1993) provide
compelling evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom on African inequality.  They
show that the extent of urban bias in SSA, even in the immediate post-independence
period, was probably exaggerated due to failure to adjust for differences between rural and
urban prices; and that the subsequent macroeconomic decline in SSA has eroded much of
whatever urban bias once existed.  The decline of urban bias in SSA is evident in some of
the policy reversals that have accompanied structural adjustment.  In the past, overvalued
exchange rates and high export taxes on cash crops favored urban over rural areas; but
devaluation and a move toward paying farmers border prices has narrowed the earlier gap. 
Economic retrogression has affected all groups of Africans – farmers and professionals,
wage earners and informal sector traders – but it has disproportionately hurt those who
depended on the modern sector.  There have been precipitous declines in earnings of
government employees, in the real value of legislated urban minimum wages and in the
growth of modern wage employment.
Africa might do better if it had lower levels of inequality, but there is nothing
exceptional in its levels to serve as a barrier to economic growth.
Is Sub-Saharan Africa Different?
No other world region has suffered the sustained economic retrogression that has16
plagued SSA.  Does this mean that SSA is structurally different and has faced some
inherent constraint on its ability to achieve long-term economic growth?  
Some analysts suggest this might be true.  Easterly and Levine (1997) focus on
SSA's high degree of ethnic diversity.  They argue that ethnic fractionalization resulted in
social polarization and elevated rent-seeking in policy making which inhibited growth. 
Sachs and Warner (1997) emphasize the region's geographic and natural endowments. 
The prevalence of landlocked economies and tropical climates, independent of rates of
factor accumulation, slowed SSA growth rates.  Diamond (1997) offers an explanation for
the constraints imposed by Africa's geography.  Unlike most other continents, Africa has a
North-South orientation which has limited the continent's rate of agricultural productivity
growth.  This is because agricultural and other technological innovations cannot easily
spread from one climate zone to another as they can on continents with an East-West
orientation.
Taken together, these explanations suggest that economies in SSA may not be able
to attain the high growth rates achieved in East and Southeast Asia.  But there is empirical
evidence to counter this view.   SSA economies have realized high rates of GDP growth in
the past: Cameroon, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, Gabon, Nigeria and Togo have enjoyed high
growth periods.  Ghana and Uganda have done so recently.   The problem has been that
most SSA countries have been unable to sustain periods of rapid growth.   Front-runners
in SSA seem to stumble and fall back.  Structural explanations, like climate, are less
adequate in accounting for such variability in economic performance. 
And there are the exceptions to SSA's economic retrogression.  Table 1 reveals a
few positive growth stories in Africa.  Botswana, Lesotho and Mauritius all have had long
term per capita growth rates in excess of 3 percent.  The answer to the question about17
which economy has had the world's fastest growth rate over the thirty year period, 1965-
1995, is not one of East Asian tigers, but ... Botswana.  What does Botswana's
extraordinary achievement imply for the rest of SSA?
Africa's Economic Miracle: Botswana
Botswana's record of GDP growth is not an empty statistical result, due to poorly
measured GDP or its particular sectoral distribution of output.  Its growth rate is matched
by improvements in other development indicators (Table 5).  Infant mortality has declined
sharply, and adult literacy and school enrollment rates have increased.  Rapid economic
growth in Botswana has improved the quality of life for a substantial fraction of the
population.  
If Botswana has succeeded while the rest of the region declined, does this
exception prove that Africa can grow?   Or can Botswana be dismissed as an outlier, too
different from its neighbors to serve as a prototype? 
Some may dismiss an economy with only 1.5 million people as too small.  But
Singapore (population 3 million) is often cited as a model.  Size should not rule Botswana
out as a case worthy of scrutiny for the rest of SSA.  Botswana displays many of the
features that have been raised as explanations for Africa's growth problems.  Botswana is
landlocked and mineral dependent (diamonds) – parameters that consistently are negative
and significant in Sachs and Warner (1997) growth regressions.  At independence in 1966,
and prior to its economic take-off, its stock of well-educated citizens was infinitesimally
low – an estimated 40 university graduates and about 100 people with secondary school
certificates (Harvey and Lewis 1990).  Apart from a rail link to South Africa, the country's
physical infrastructure was equally limited.  By international standards, its Gini coefficient18
of .54 (Deininger and Squire 1996) indicates a high degree of inequality.   For most of the
past thirty years, Botswana has been surrounded by wars of independence and civil unrest
in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, which limited access to
ports and created a host of problems from harboring refugees to playing regional politics.  
But unlike most SSA countries, Botswana did not regress.  It thrived.  
 The major lesson from Botswana is that nations in SSA can grow at rapid rates. 
Why Botswana succeeded is not well understood.  Unlike its East Asian counterparts,
Africa's economic miracle has not been as rigorously studied and debated.  EconLit, the
authoritative index of books and journal articles in economics, identifies only 18 citations
on "Botswana, economic growth" while a similar subject search on Korea yields 271. 
From the limited work on Botswana, especially the comprehensive study by Harvey and
Lewis (1990), some inferences can be made.
One inference is that economic policies matter.  Botswana chose prudent fiscal and
macroeconomic directions.  Heavily dependent on revenues from its diamond mines,
Botswana's officials avoided "Dutch disease".  They did not engage in excessive spending
of export windfalls which would have led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and
hurt both agricultural and non-mining industrial growth.  Nominal exchange rates were
adjusted to maintain a competitive and stable real exchange rate. Participation in the South
Africa Customs Union limited lobbying for favors in the trade arena and spared Botswana
from some of the rent-seeking and inefficiency that characterized import substitution
schemes elsewhere in SSA (Rodrik 1997).  The public sector pursued few "white
elephants" and allocated resources based on economic and social returns.  Successful
negotiations with large foreign investors and state investment in education, especially in
the primary levels, are further examples of the good economic management of the nation's19
leadership.
A second inference one might draw from Botswana is that it has succeeded as a
small democracy with a strong and independent civil service whereas neighboring
countries have failed under various forms of dictatorship (Holm 1994).  Perhaps
democratic regimes are more necessary for growth in Africa than in other parts of the
world because African dictators (for whatever reason) tend to try to improve their
incomes by raising their share of output rather than by gaining a constant share of an
increased level of GDP.  Perhaps smaller countries are more conducive for growth in a
continent with ethnic diversity.
Success usually attracts imitation, and one wonders why countries nearby did not 
emulate Botswana's approach and why the development community drew Africa's
attention to role models thousands of miles away in the Pacific rather than to one in SSA's
own backyard.   Whatever the reasons, Botswana stands as an important example of  the
possibility for economic success in SSA and of the importance of good governance in
overcoming the obstacles to sustained economic growth.
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Reviving Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa
The preceding analysis suggests that the standard reasons given for poor growth in
SSA do not constitute iron-clad barriers.  The region may have a poorly educated labor
force but the activity of African traders, or the success of African immigrants in advanced
economies, demonstrates the labor skills that are waiting to be called upon, given capital
and a modern economic environment.  African capital flight and the resource rents of its
mineral wealth offer large pools of  latent savings for productive investments at home. 20
Africa may not have an ideal set of “building blocks” for successful growth, but neither do
most other developing economies.   Why then has Africa failed to grow? 
African growth has been stifled by political turmoil, often the result of non-
democratic unstable regimes, and by the accompanying absence of protection of property
and capital.  We hypothesize that there is a lexicographic ordering to the determinants of
growth and that first and foremost is political stability and the security of property. 
Without this base, investments in education, openness, and levels of income equality have
little effect on growth.  The reason returns to schooling are low in Africa, that capital
flight is high, and that the shift toward free trade has not created growth miracles is that
schooling, investment, and trade operate successfully only in a peaceful, stable,
environment for economic activity.
Consider first the most extreme form of political turmoil, war.  War plagues the
region.  By our count, twelve SSA countries representing one quarter of the region's total
population, were war-torn usually for prolonged periods, between 1975-1995.   The
Economist (1998) reports "nearly a third of sub-Saharan Africa's 42 countries [today] are
embroiled in international or civil wars."  The burden of war is reflected in another
statistic.  SSA accounts for 10 percent of the world's population but harbors 46 percent of
the world's refugees and those internally displaced by war (Haughton 1997).  
Just as war discourages the productive accumulation that SSA needs, corruption
plays a similar role.  According to a study of corruption in 54 countries, including 30 low
and middle income economies, the four SSA nations in the sample (Nigeria, Kenya,





16  Dictatorships need not
be inimical to economic growth.  But African dictators have a particularly poor record in
choosing policies that are growth-augmenting.  They are among the world’s best examples21
of rent-seeking political actors.
The result of war, corruption, dictatorship is that sub-Saharan Africa ranks low in
the basic economic protections that are necessary for economic growth.  The Heritage
Foundation/Wall Street Journal has developed an Index of Economic Freedom that
demonstrates this proposition.  In 1998, just three African countries ranked in the top 50
countries by economic freedom – Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland – while 50 percent
of African countries fit in the lowest grouping of countries.  One need not accept  the
details of the Index to appreciate the overall validity of the picture.
There is no simple nor single recipe for achieving economic growth, but there is
one way to prevent growth: though instability and absence of property rights.  SSA needs
peace, less corruption, and secure property rights so that its people can invest in
productive activities.   Capitalism is a sturdy economic system, permissive of a variety of
permutations.   If African countries can establish a stable political environment which
enables people to gain the rewards of investment in physical or human capital, the alleged
barriers to growth – education, trade, inequality, geography, and climate – will, in our
view, prove surmountable.22
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TABLE 1
When Did Countries in SSA First Reach Their Current GDP/N Level?
ECONOMIC DECLINE:  94% of Population 
Before 1960’s: 

















































73,500 people  (0.01%)
YEAR
Seychelles 92








Note: Equatorial Guinea and Eritrea are excluded because of lack of data.
Source:  See Appendix 1 for derivation.27
Table 2:  Schooling by Region
School Enrollment Rate (%)
Region Adult Illiteracy (%)
 1995                              
Primary Secondary
1970 1992 1970 1992
Sub-Saharan Africa 43 50 72 7 24
East Asia 17 88 117 24 52
South Asia 51 67 101 25 39
Middle East/
North Africa
39 68 97 24 59
Latin America/ 
Caribbean
13 95 110 28 51
Source:  World Bank Indicators (1997)28
Table 3:  Regional Participation in International Trade and Capital Flows, 1995 (percent)
Region Share of World GDP Share of World Trade
a Share of Trade in GDP




Share of Net Private
Capital Flows
b
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.1 1.4 50.7 0.3 5.9
East Asia 4.8 7.0 54.3 12.8 54.6
South Asia 1.6 1.0 24.4 7.3 3.4
Middle East/
North Africa
1.5 2.1 51.0 -0.0 0.9
Latin America/
Caribbean
6.1 4.4 27.2 5.9 35.2
a. Trade equals exports plus imports.
b. Flows to low and middle income economies excluding those to Europe and Central Asia.
Source:  World Development Indicators (1997)29
Table 4:  Income Inequality by Region







East Asia South Asia
High
Inequality
Guatemala       
(30.0)
Panama          
(29.9)
Brazil          
(26.3)
Puerto Rico     
(18.3)
Chile           
(17.3)
Venezuela       
(16.2)
Colombia        
(15.1)
Honduras        
(14.7)
Mexico          
(13.4)
South Africa   (32.1)
Guinea Bissau  (28.6)
Botswana       (20.9)
Kenya          (18.2)
Senegal        (16.8)
Lesotho        (16.4)
Zimbabwe       (15.7)
Thailand       (15.8)
Medium
Inequality
Dominican Rep.  
(13.3)
Nicaragua       
(13.1)
Costa Rica      
(12.7)
Peru            
(10.3)
Ecuador          (
9.8)
Bolivia          (
8.6)
Guyana           (
7.5)
Mauritania     (13.1)
Nigeria        (12.4)
Zambia         ( 8.9)
Madagascar     ( 8.5)
Uganda         ( 7.1)
Tunisia         (7.9)
Jordan          (7.4)
Morocco         
(7.0)
Malaysia       (11.7) 
Philippines    (10.1)
Low
Inequality
Jamaica          (
6.3)
Tanzania       (6.6)
Cote d’lvoire  (6.5)
Mauritius      (6.5)
Niger          (5.9)
Ghana          (5.3)
Algeria         (6.8)
Egypt           (4.7)
China          ( 6.9)
Korea          ( 5.7)
Vietnam        ( 5.5)
Taiwan         ( 5.4)
Indonesia      ( 4.7)
Laos           ( 4.2)
Pakistan       ( 4.7)
India          ( 4.7)
Sri Lanka      ( 4.4)
Bangladesh     ( 4.0)
Note: High, medium and low inequality categories were determined by rank ordering all countries in the sample and dividing into thirds.  Data refer to most
recent year available.  Only countries with estimates since 1985 are included.  World regions are ordered horizontally from highest to lowest mean level of
regional inequality.
Source:  Deininger and Squire (1996)3031





GNP per capita (1995 US $) 
a 458 3020 490
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live births) 95 56 92
Life Expectancy at Birth (years) 50 68 52
Total Fertility Rate (number of children) 6.9 4.4 5.7
Adult Literacy Rate (percent) 35%
b 70% 57%
Primary School Enrollment Rate




Secondary School Enrollment Rate




a.  World Bank Atlas Method, Botswana, 1970.  Adjusted to 1995 US $ using U.S.
implicit GDP price deflator.
b.  For 1976.  World Bank (1981)
c.  For 1992-93.
Source:  African Development Indicators (1997), World Bank Development Indicators (1997)32
APPENDIX 1:
Table 1 was derived using the RGDPL variable (Real GDP per Capita (Laspeyres Index-
1985IP) in the Penn World Tables 5.6. The Penn Tables contain income per capita data 
through  1992 except for Ethiopia and Liberia (1986); Angola, Botswana,
Niger, Somalia, and Zaire (1989); and Benin, Mali, Senegal, Sudan, and Zambia(1991). 
GDP per Capita data was projected until 1995 using the annual GDP and population
growth rates from the World Development Indicators 1997 on CD-ROM.  When growth
data were unavailable until 1995, we assumed zero growth for the country.  Countries that
had missing growth data include:   Liberia (87);  Somalia(87);  Zaire(93); and Sudan,
Seychelles, Angola, and Cape Verde(94).  
Population totals were taken from the World Development Indicators 1997 CD-ROM
published by the World Bank.33
1   Even this figure exaggerates the positive record.  In addition to the successful growers –
Botswana, Cape Verde, Lesotho and Mauritius – the total includes Tanzania. Tanzania,
accounting for 30 of the 35 million people in the economic growth category, is one of the five
poorest nations in the world yet joins this group because after decades of economic
stagnation, it has achieved about one percent real economic growth per annum over the last
decade.
2  Bigsten and Horton (1997) cite several other studies of education and earnings in SSA,
covering Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, that reach a similar
conclusion.
3  World Bank (1995), Table 2, lists 11 countries in SSA that experienced stagnation or
decline in school enrollments during the 1980s.
4   One of the better studies on school quality and returns to education is Behrman and
Birdsall (1983).  The authors find that by including a proxy for school quality the
estimated rate of return to years of schooling in Brazil was cut in half. 
5  See Pritchett (1997), pp. 34-57, for additional hypotheses reconciling the accumulation
of schooling with low (or negative) growth outcomes.
6   Collier and Gunning (1997), Sachs and Warner (1995), and others generate similar
findings.
7   An example from Pritchett (1997) illustrates this point.  "Korea's secondary enrollment
rate in 1960 was 27 percent while Great Britain's was 66 percent.  But the level of 
schooling of Britain's labor force in 1960 was 7.7 years while Korea's was 3.2 years. 
Subsequently, Great Britain's enrollment increased to 83 percent by 1975 and then
remained relatively constant; Korea's enrollment rate increased from 27 to 87 percent by
1983.  Given these differences in initial stocks and the large changes in enrollment rates,
Korea's years of schooling expanded massively from 3.2 to 7.8 by 1985 while Britain's
expanded only from 7.7 to 8.6."
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8   These results are replicated in other studies, including Benhabib and Spiegel 1994. 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1997 report insignificant coefficients on the change in schooling
attainment in their growth regressions.
9    According to the human capital model, the logarithm of earnings depends on absolute
years of schooling.  Percentage changes in earnings (GDP per worker), therefore, should
be regressed on absolute changes in schooling years.  What the logarithmic transformation
accomplishes is to change the metric of schooling (units of time) into the metric of
earnings (dollar units).  The equivalent of a percentage change in physical capital in a
growth equation, thus, is the absolute change in years of schooling.
10   There are still other issues regarding the specification of education in growth
regressions.  A prerequisite for growth may be achievement of some minimum threshold
level of education of the work force, for example, a minimum percentage of the labor
force must have attended the primary grades.  Such thresholds may be necessary to take
advantage of available technologies and facilitate the process of economic catch-up
(Azariadis and Drazen 1990).   But econometric support for this position is limited, and
given the quality of the education data, is unlikely to be readily forthcoming.  
11  Openness is measured as the proportion of years in which an economy passes the
following four tests of openness: (1) average tariff rates fall below 40 percent; (2) average
quota and licensing coverage of imports is less than 40 percent; (3) the black market
exchange rate premium is less than 20 percent; and (4) no extreme controls on exports, in
the form of state monopolies or prohibitive duties, exist.  Levine and Renelt (1992)
employ other measures of trade policy distortion, including black-market exchange rate
premiums and Dollar's (1992) index of real exchange-rate distortion, and while these
variables are of the expected sign, the results, unlike those of Sachs and Warner, are not
robust.
12   Obstfeld (1995) provides further evidence confirming this tendency.
13  Rodrik (1997) regresses the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP on population, per
capita income and distance from the world's major trading economies.  A dummy variable
for SSA proves insignificant.
14  Further results from World Bank (1997) suggest that China will account for less than a
quarter of all exports from what are today's low and middle income economies.  SSA will
see its share of world exports rise from 1.7 to 2.4 percent.
15 Botswana's recent experience highlights this point.  Between 1965-1990, growth in
GNP per capita averaged 8.4 percent per annum, fast enough for per capita income to
double in less than a decade.  In the 1990s, Botswana's growth rate has slowed to 1.7%,
due in part to excessive growth in government spending and a decline in the productivity
of public expenditures.  Like East Asia, although not necessarily for the same reasons,35
Botswana is learning that continued rapid growth cannot be taken for granted.
16 International Corruption Ranking is a joint initiative of Transparency International and
Gottingen University.